During his first term as President of Russia, Vladimir Putin called the collapse of the Soviet Union a “genuine tragedy.” Such clues have led Western leaders to conclude that Putin genuinely wants to rebuild the Soviet Empire. And while Eastern European states (with the exception of Belarus) are turning against their former Moscovian overlords, Central Asian states have remained generally neutral. How has Russia prevented the western tilt of these nations? Will this continue to be the case?

Let’s begin with the Collective Security Treaty Organization, better known as the CSTO. Largely seen as a Russian NATO, its founding in 2002 brought together six former Soviet states into one bloc. Its member states, which included both Caucuses states like Armenia and Central Asian ones like Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, depended upon Russia for security assistance. The epitome of Russian influence, am I right? However, the organization has lost its relevance since the early 2010s. The first crack emerged in 2010, when Tajikistan, a member, was denied assistance from the CSTO to fight an ethnic insurgency. Its failure to resolve border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan further weakened Moscow’s standing. Following Russia’s declaration that four new independent states had been formed from the provinces it conquered from Ukraine, none of the other five CSTO members recognized these Republics. The move was an implicit rejection of Russia’s territorial bullying. For these reasons, the CSTO is largely seen as a dying organization, no longer an effective vehicle to project Russian soft power. 

However, Russia still has its methods to convince intransigent states to be on its side. In 2008, for example, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili made clear his intention to join NATO. Russian troops launched an invasion into Northern Georgia, while Western nations stood by and watched. This show of force effectively crippled the legitimacy of Saakashvili’s government. Following the end of his term in 2013, he left for Ukraine. The now-dominant Georgia Dream Party is widely considered to be pro-Moscow, and has once again delayed accession to the EU until 2028. Scholars who closely studied Russia’s two invasions of Ukraine have noted their startling similarities to the invasion of Georgia. 

It also helps that many Central Asian states are not palatable political friends for the West. Excluding Kyrgyzstan, the other four “stan” nations are consolidated authoritarian states. Uzbekistan’s president, Shavkat Mirzyoyev, changed the Constitution last year to allow presidential terms to last seven years, and reset the clock on term limits, so his earlier years in office don’t count. This move is a near carbon copy of one made by Vladimir Putin in 2020. Kazakhstan, the largest state in Central Asia, is also sliding toward authoritarianism following a few high-profile jailings of opposition figures over the past year. In 2022, the country’s president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, called on Russian aid to quash a popular uprising against his rule. 2,000 Russian paratroopers arrested thousands of protesters, and the violence ceased. Such incidents prove that Central Asian autocrats still rely heavily on Russia as a guide and a protector.

But this doesn’t mean that the West has no friends in the region. After Azerbaijan seized the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region from Armenia in 2023, driving thousands of refugees back to their home country, the government in Yerevan has begun leaning westward. The nation feels betrayed by Russia, a country it had been loyal to since the Soviet collapse, yet one which has never reciprocated that support with military assistance. Between the end of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and April of this year, the West pledged over $300 million of military assistance to Armenia, a shocking increase from practically none before this point. Yet this new alliance is likely one of expedience. Few nations worldwide, democracies or autocracies, are loyal allies of the United States. Most simply want to get the most out of the powerful countries while maintaining their own sovereignty. And Armenia is no different. 

Yet speaking of alliances of expedience, Russia’s neighbors are far from dedicated to the Russian state. They recognize that Russia cannot provide their export-dominated economies with a large demand for manufactured goods. For that reason, Central Asian states have formed the B5+1 forum, a platform by which lower trade barriers between the US and the region have been negotiated. Though this move peeves Russia, it was inevitable considering the West's large market. But China has not been standing idly by either, establishing itself as the region’s largest economic trade partner. Nevertheless, the cultural and political influence Moscow maintains over the region is quite hefty, so don’t expect these former Soviet states to escape Moscow’s orbit anytime soon!

Vladimir Putin once noted that “Anyone who doesn’t regret the passing of the Soviet Union has no heart. Anyone who wants it restored has no brains.” Putin will not allow his Asian neighbors to escape his grasp. Though he doesn’t want to rule over them directly, expect him to be keeping a close eye on anyone who tries to challenge his influence in the region. 

Read More Here:

• Sergio Cantone, Euronews

• Aliya Tlegenova and Serik Beysembaev, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

• Eurasianet Editors, Eurasianet

Homer Simpson is typically not known for his erudite insights on world affairs, but he does have occasional sparks of brilliance. Once, Homer even read an Economist article about Indonesia at a crossroads. After Donald Trump’s victory in the 2024 US presidential election, this refrain rings truer than ever before. With geostrategic competition between the US and China heating up in the Indo Pacific, Asian nations have been forced to straddle the delicate line of managing the relationship between two of the world’s biggest superpowers. Indonesian is an excellent example of this balancing act. 

In an apt metaphor of Indonesian foreign policy, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto called Trump in a passionate conversation to congratulate him, yet on top of Subianto’s desk lay a copy of China Daily - the official English language newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party. As one of the world’s most populous and largest economies, Indonesia holds outsize power in US-China competition, and it has seized on this opportunity to gain benefits from both superpowers. 

Indonesia has pursued a traditional policy of neutrality toward the US and China, but Subianto has shown a slight bias to China. From signing a $10 billion deal with China covering infrastructure, green energy, digital technology agriculture, to wanting to join BRICS, Subianto has sought to gain closer relations with China and benefit from its economic power in growing Indonesia’s economy. In fact, the biggest rhetorical shift from Subianto’s administration is that Indonesia is starting to consider China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea to be “overlapping” with Indonesia’s instead of being wholly illegitimate. This is so significant because it signals Indonesia may be open to using territorial disputes as a bargaining chip to gain more favorable ties with China instead of unilaterally opposing Chinese claims. 

One of the threats to US relations with Indonesia is the US, especially the incoming Trump administration, continually views Southeast Asia as “prizes and pawns” in the chess game against China, instead of treating Southeast Asian nations as equals deserving of respect from both the US and China. Further weakening the US position in SE Asia is the fact that Chinese economic power is rising relative to US power. US trade with Southeast Asia grew by 62.4% from 2010 to 2019 while China’s skyrocketed by a staggering 115% during the same period. In the long term, the US share of the region’s total trade fell from 16.1% in 2000 to 11.6% in 2020, while China’s share rose from 4.3% to 19.4%. 

Fortunately, not all is lost. Indonesia is not capitulating to China, but rather views it as a credible and reasonable partner worthy of deepening relations with. Indonesia has continued to protect its national sovereignty, including by announcing astronomical tariffs of up to 200% on Chinese-made goods to protest domestic small businesses, surely a move tariff-loving Trump can appreciate. Additionally, Indonesia has maintained military neutrality by holding joint military exercises with both China and the US in August of 2024. However, China’s military cooperation with Indonesia is limited by a lack of education, joint training, and militarily industrial collaboration. 

It is incumbent upon the incoming Trump administration to prove to Indonesia, and all other Southeast Asian nations, that the US is a reliable and genuine partner. Otherwise, in the crossroads of foreign policy, Southeast Asia will walk toward China.

Read more here:

• Christopher S. Chivvis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

• Jonathan Stromseth, Brookings Institution

• Alica Ba, USIP 

On December 3, 2024, President Yoon Suk Yeol declared martial law in South Korea. This decree gave the military the authority to suspend the government, maintain order, and restrict civil liberties as they saw fit. Yoon justified his decision by claiming it was necessary “to safeguard a liberal South Korea from the threats posed by North Korea’s communist forces and to eliminate anti-state elements” (Al Jazeera). He argued that this move was in the country's best interest, but many believe it was more about protecting his own presidency.

Yoon has been struggling to get his policies passed since taking office in 2022, largely due to opposition from the Democratic Party. The party has criticized his governance and rejected his reforms, citing concerns about economic inequality, foreign policy, and transparency. As a result, Yoon has faced increasing pressure from both political sides, with his administration being described as “deeply unpopular,” and accused of wrongdoings. According to the BBC, Yoon’s government has faced growing scrutiny, and some believe his martial law declaration was an attempt to hold onto power amid these challenges. His decision seemed to focus on his own career rather than addressing any real threats to South Korea.

This declaration triggered chaos throughout South Korea on the night of December 3, 2024. Protests broke out as people gathered in the streets demanding the removal of martial law, with many unions also planning to strike unless Yoon is impeached. Under the decree, political gatherings were banned and parliamentary meetings were suspended, with violators facing arrest without a warrant. The Daily Mail reported that the military's presence near parliament led to “furious lawmakers” forcing their way past soldiers to challenge the decree. Protesters also called for Yoon’s removal and opposed any return to the country's authoritarian past. KCRA reported that once inside, South Korean lawmakers, including members of Yoon’s own party, condemned the decree as illegal and unconstitutional. The leader of Yoon’s People Power Party even called the decision the wrong move.

Despite the ban on political gatherings, parliament met and voted unanimously to lift the order. However, the military announced martial law would remain until President Yoon formally removed it. The intense pressure from both lawmakers and the public led to President Yoon lifting the decree just six hours after it had been enacted.

The failed attempt to impose martial law has left President Yoon facing serious political consequences. The move was unpopular with both the public and the parliament, and opposition lawmakers have called for his impeachment. Business Live reported that “police said they were investigating claims of treason against him and top ministers.” With his presidency under fire, it appears that President Yoon’s future now remains uncertain.

President Yoon Suk Yeol’s declaration of martial law in December of 2024 backfired, sparking widespread protests and condemnation from lawmakers and the public. His failed attempt to maintain control has led to calls for his impeachment and investigations into political treason. As the situation unfolds, Yoon’s political future remains uncertain with his presidency facing significant challenges.

Read more here:

• Staff, Al Jazeera

• Frances Mao, BBC

• David Averre, Daily Mail

• Jessie Yeung, KCRA

In 2021, Justin Bieber shook up the music world, singing “I got my peaches out in Georgia.” Unfortunately, the country (no, not the state) can’t grow peaches…or, anything, because it is being rocked by political turmoil. 

Protests by the Georgian people have reached their second week, due to the Georgian Dream, a right-leaning populist party, suspending talks to join the EU until, at earliest, 2028. The political group did this in response to a European Parliament statement that the October 26th parliamentary elections, decided by popular vote, were not free and fair. 

Traditionally, Georgia has been anti-Russian and pro-European Union, so being part of the organization has always been a goal. The International Republican Institute reports that 89% of the population supports EU membership. 

A switch to a fully parliamentary system in 2017 means that current president Salome Zourabichvili, who has no party affiliation, is the last president to be elected directly by the people. The 150-seat Georgian Parliament now wields considerable power, because it will hold half the votes in the 300-member electoral college that will determine the next president in a month. The massive chance to gain both legislative and executive power is why the elections were so hotly contested. 

The Georgian Dream claimed victory, but several opposition groups have called it a fraud. An analysis by the Carnegie Endowment of several data sources highlights that the party won anywhere from 42-54% of the popular vote, which is in the range that determines victory. Criticism of the election process comes from accusations such as voters voting multiple times using other people’s identities and intimidation of observers at the polls. 

Despite leaning toward Russia, it’s possible that the Georgian Dream party won because voters bought into their pitch of ending the war and peace. But considering that a resounding majority of Georgians still support joining the EU, there are several people who split their vote between the populist party and pro-EU opinion. 

The Georgian Dream may bring the country closer to Russia because of their past activity. This May, the party’s parliamentary majority evaded a veto by President Zourbichvili to pass a foreign agent law, which forced non-governmental organizations to describe themselves as “acting in foreign interest.” Advocation groups get about 90% of their funding from international groups, which potentially ended up in the silencing of several opposing voices. This likely weakened competition against the Georgian Dream in a non-democratic way. PM Kobakhidze has already garnered support from Russia and Hungary. The latter can veto any EU legislation by blocking a unanimous resolution, largely giving the Georgian Dream protection from Western scrutiny.

Opposition groups share a common enemy, but their revolts are not by any means united. Two of the most prominent ones are the pro-Western Coalition for Change Party, led by Nika Gvaramia, and the Strong Georgia party, led by Alexandre “Aleko” Elisahvili. At the hands of police mobilization to stop strong political protests, both leaders have been detained by Georgian police. This has prompted international scrutiny because of limiting free speech, but the Georgian Dream cite the need for stability to justify their violent ways. 

With all that said, this comes to show that despite EU efforts to isolate Russia, the country’s ideals are continuing to spill into other countries’ political affairs. Georgia’s situation will certainly trouble the West, causing further tensions. A path to the long-standing goal of joining the EU looks uncrossable. It’s essential that the situation of Georgia, the country, becomes more relevant than Justin Bieber, and peaches in its namesake US state.

Read more here:

• Staff, Euronews

• Staff, International Republican Institute

• Ivan Nechepurenko, New York Times

• Alexander Atasuntsev, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

• Marc Goedemans, CFR

• Marie Jégo, Le Monde

• Felix Light, Reuters