The Limitations of a Negative Fiat
Fiat, translated from Latin as “let it be done,” plays an integral role in evaluating the desirability of a hypothetical action by allowing debaters to envision a world in which the action has been taken and discuss the value and impacts accordingly. Traditionally, the affirmative debater is granted “fiat power” to test the desirability of their plan without concerns about implementation: we’re concerned with what should or ought to happen, not what probably will happen.
Affirmative appeals to fiat initially raised controversy over the extent to which affs get fiat power, like if the public attitude is changed by fiat or if fiat interrupts political processes?” However, the debate community has, mostly, reached a consensus on this, viewing affirmative fiat as the assumption that normal governmental processes have resulted in the proposed plan with nothing else affected.
While affirmative fiat is mostly agreed upon, the extent of negative fiat remains a contentious issue despite almost 40 years of discussion (Solt 1989). Negative fiat exists in the context of counterplans. Defining the “counterplan” is not a neutral task, as any definition implicitly favors certain interpretations of their validity, or at the very least influences the conditions under which a “counterplan” may be valid. Perhaps the best way to define a counterplan is to distinguish it from a traditional disadvantage. A disadvantage (disad or DA) attempts to disprove the desirability of the plan by showing that:
1] The current situation is good (uniqueness or UQ).
2] The plan disturbs that situation (link).
3] The disturbance causes harm (impact).
Through this, the neg proves that the plan is worse than the status quo.
On the other hand, counterplans aim to demonstrate that a plan should not be endorsed, not because it causes negative effects at face value, but because it trades off with a better action. This action can be “better” in that it solves the harm while avoiding a disad (advantage CP) solves a different, more important harm but would be impossible to do alongside the plan (uniqueness CP), does the aff differently (process & actor CPs), or does part of the aff but avoids a particular, harmful part (plan inclusive CP).
This definition still takes an implicit stance by weighing plans and counterplans on the same grounds as competing solutions, but for the sake of argument, in a debate environment where discovering and discussing normative solutions can be more valuable than short-term practicalities, this seems to be a valid objection to an aff plan. To demonstrate the merits of a proposed alternative, neg debaters argue that fiat is necessary.
However, this seemingly reciprocal power by the neg is more nuanced under closer examination due to the restraints of topicality. Firstly, although the term “affirmative fiat” is used in this article to disambiguate it from “negative fiat,” affirmative fiat does not uniquely benefit the affirmative debater. Without affirmative fiat, the debate itself could not occur since neither debater has the power to enforce the plan. On the other hand, a model for discussion without negative fiat could feasibly occur, where the affirmative defends the advantages of the plan and the negative explains the disadvantages. Additionally, plans are by default constrained to the resolution and are thus typically reasonable proposals; on the other hand, imagining an alternative to the resolution requires no burden of topicality, meaning that counterplan fiat opens the door to serious neg abuses (Solt 1989). For example, on a topic about the US increasing defense capacity, the affirmative debater must defend something along those lines, but a negative counterplan could fiat that all countries of the world enter an agreement to disarm themselves. Or, a counterplan could demand that the world undergo an anarcho-communist revolution, which certainly is an alternative to any government action. These examples may seem extreme, but nothing intrinsic to the idea of negative fiat implies that these are not valid counterplans; indeed, counterplans like these flourished in the early days of policy debate. Some object that these counterplans are “utopian” (whatever that means), or that they take advantage of “fiating private entities” or “fiating multiple actors” Perhaps neither the aff nor the neg debater should be granted that level of fiat power or all debates will depart from the resolution entirely.
Here we must briefly note the differences between this discussion's applicability to LD and Policy (CX). For example, policy debate has a 2NC speech, creating the issue of debaters running new uniqueness counterplans in the 2NC to take out 2AC uniqueness debates, which is not as much of an issue in LD. Additionally, CX and LD topics differ in nature. As the name implies, policy debate resolutions typically describe state action in a certain direction, leading to plans that consist of specific policy action. Since the 1976- 77 CX topic, every policy resolution has explicitly specified the US federal government as the actor. On the other hand, LD resolutions are questions of morality, and while they sometimes describe an action achievable through policy, the intended actor or action is often vague. This means the extent of aff fiat, and by reciprocal extension, neg fiat is more convoluted in the world of LD.
Regardless of these differences, the core controversy of negative fiat and its discussion in this article should apply to both events. However, some discussion of nuances necessary for a realistic implementation in LD debate may not be necessary for CX. This article will be more geared towards LD norms and interactions.
For example, the 2022-23 January/February LD topic reads: “Resolved: Justice requires open borders for human migration.” If the aff debater interprets this as “fiat that all borders turn into open borders, and then evaluate the desirability of that world” then they are using multi-actor international fiat. Should neg CPs on that topic then be able to access multi-actor fiat as well? Would there be anything wrong then with the counterplan “all nation-states should unilaterally respect all human rights, implement democratic structures of government, and implement efficient legal pathways for immigration and emigration?” This seems to solve the aff and it’s meaningless to argue that this is “less realistic” than all countries unilaterally opening their borders unconditionally to all migration. At the same time, the approach seems to skip around the intended core debate ground implied by the resolution. How do we deal with this?
In light of the previously discussed abuses made possible by unchecked neg fiat, it is widely accepted that limits of some sort must exist. Ultimately, enforcement of these ideas relies on in-round theory debates, but having a fleshed-out conceptualization of valid negative fiat may inform more coherent community norm-setting.
Counterplan Types
Perhaps a good starting point for determining reasonable counterplan norms is to examine the broad categories that counterplans fall into and evaluate their validity from a standpoint of both debatability and educational value.
First, let’s look at an advantage counterplan. Imagine that the plan is to guarantee the right to housing, and the thesis of the aff is that doing so is essential to preventing climate change. The neg reads that the right to housing causes some sort of issue, say political backlash, and then reads a counterplan that attempts to prevent climate change, like advanced carbon sequestration. If we strip this debate down to its core, it seems that the aff has identified harm (climate change) and a solution (housing). The neg has presented an issue with the solution (politics) and an alternative solution that avoids the issue (carbon sequestration). Without the counterplan, the neg would have to rely on political backlash outweighing climate change to disprove the aff’s desirability, but by showing that the aff solution isn’t the only one available, the neg significantly devalues it. This neg strategy seems fairly intuitive and valid, and we can imagine that two good-faith scholars may make the same arguments to each other. From a debate perspective, this is the bread and butter of counterplans. It attempts to solve the harm of the aff in a better way while indicting the aff approach. While some may object that these counterplans circumvent the core discussion by only solving for the terminal impact of the aff—sometimes in ways that are completely irrelevant to the aff—it is quite reasonable that if the aff claims to solve a problem (like climate change), they have prepared defense as to why they are the best or only solution to that problem. Additionally, the counterplan can only depart from the aff insofar as the impacts proposed by the aff depart from the aff action. For example, an aff impact on solving homelessness would force advantage counterplans to be far more related to the right to housing. Overall, advantage counterplans are perfectly valid on theoretical grounds.
Next, let's examine a plan inclusive counterplan (PIC). Imagine the plan is to withdraw all soldiers from the Middle East, and the advantage presented is that our military is overburdened and needs to deploy troops elsewhere. The neg reads that withdrawing from Saudi Arabia would hurt our implicit agreements to protect them, leading them to pursue nuclear self-defense, and then reads a counterplan that we should withdraw all soldiers from the Middle East except Saudi Arabia. If we boil this debate down, the aff has a harm (overburdening), and a solution (withdrawal). The neg states that some of the aff is a good idea, but some of it isn’t, and instead suggests that we indeed do the good parts (the PIC), but avoid the bad parts (the link to the Saudi Assurances DA). How valid is this?
If a PE coach states that all students must run a mile, but one student is in a wheelchair, is it a valid objection to state: “Your plan is bad; instead, all but the student with a disability should be required to run the mile?” Intuitively, yes, this objection is valid. However, one may argue that a debate topic phrased as “Should running a mile be mandatory for students” assumes that the affirmative allows for exceptions like these by default. Under this view, making the debate about those exceptions is a cheap shot that overlooks the core intended controversy of a resolution. Yet claims about “core intended controversy” and “assumed exceptions” seem arbitrary. Even if this idea is true to an extent, proving which exceptions are assumed, or finding the “core” controversy, is a shot in the dark at best. As in the Middle East example, does the statement “we should withdraw from the Middle East” really imply exceptions as grand as not applying the withdrawal to the entire Saudi Arabia? Even if it may allow for exceptions when stretched to its interpretational limit, it certainly does not imply that such exceptions are to be expected.
Furthermore, I believe that “some of your plan is good, but some of it is bad, so just do the good part” is a valid point, so the PIC cannot be outright rejected. From a fairness point of view, PICs are widely accepted, as a smaller departure from the aff means a lesser ability to avoid the proposed negative impacts of the aff (this is called linking to the net benefit), and a larger departure means the counterplan is more open to solvency deficits which naturally checks PICs. Additionally, if we consider the “exceptions are implied” view, the aff can argue that the PIC is simply describing the aff plan so “permutation: do the CP” should take out the counterplan. Finally, the better grasp the aff has over their plan and the more carefully they choose what exactly they defend, the harder it is to PIC out of any part of it. A good aff should choose every single word of the plan with thought and care. In any case, PICs are not intrinsically abusive.
What about a counterplan that does not attempt to solve the same harms as the aff? The view of counterplans as “alternate solutions” works nicely in intuitively explaining why they are fair and logical negative ground, but it is ultimately too narrow a view. While plans may function as “solutions,” they are fundamentally just “actions.” The “harm to be solved” may be implied by the action, but it is not intrinsic to it. Thus, instead of just “there’s a better solution” objections, what about “those resources could be used better” objections? For example, imagine the plan is to send a new model of US fighter jets to the Middle East, with the intent of deterring rising hostility by Iran. The neg reads a counterplan stating that those jets should instead be sent to Ukraine to help them fend off Russia. Putting aside the truth of the arguments, is the nature of the objection valid? This is called a “uniqueness counterplan” because we could view the Russia-Ukraine scenario as a disad needing uniqueness.
1] US needs to send the best jets to Ukraine (UQ)
2] Plan uses up the best jets (link)
3] Jets help Ukraine win which prevents escalation and global war (impact)
The only problem? Even if we reject the aff, there’s no guarantee that the US will send those jets to Ukraine. Thus, the counterplan serves as uniqueness for the jets DA.
This is akin to saying “Even though that action is good, you should not do it because you could be doing a better action.” Is this a valid objection? If I spend 3$ on buying a candy bar (solves the harm of my sweet tooth) and someone tells me that I should instead be donating that money (solves the harm of someone dying from starvation), I may feel that this is not a valid objection despite it being a competitive alternate action that achieves greater good. However, we must understand that the affirmative side of a resolution is not an expression of free will but is itself a question of moral obligations (what “should” or “ought” we do). With this in mind, the option of donating may not quite prove that I am morally obligated not to buy candy bars, but it is much more reasonable to assert that it disproves any moral obligation I had to buy candy bars. Additionally, the government should have no “will” of its own besides helping its constituents, so if one choice is objectively better, it is a valid consideration.
In actual debate rounds, the uniqueness counterplan is rare due to a scarcity of good link evidence. The scenario I contrived with the “best jets” needed for Ukraine is unlikely to occur in the real world. In most cases, the biggest cost is funding the bill, and that rarely trades off one-to-one with another policy. If you believe the cost of a bill to be too high, you’re better off running an econ disad rather than saying it makes another bill impossible to fund. However, in specific scenarios where a resource is limited, the uniqueness counterplan may become viable and is generally considered fair.
There is another form of uniqueness counterplan in policy debate where the neg debater retroactively counterplans out of a losing uniqueness debate. For example, if the 2AC reads a really good block to the 1NC’s “econ good now” uniqueness, the 2NC may counterplan out by reading a CP that fixes the economy. While some may view this as unfair, any unfairness stems from being read in the 2NC or abusing fiat in some other way, not from the fact that uniqueness is being fiated. In LD, this form of counterplan would have to be read in the 2NR, making it not a viable option.
The next of the major counterplans is the infamous process counterplan. So far, all the counterplans have suggested a different policy action than the plan, but this and the next counterplan aim to have the same resulting action. This is extremely strategic for the neg, as it allows them to garner 100% of the aff offense and win on even a slight net benefit. Popular examples include the “consult CP” (The US should consult NATO and only withdraw troops from the Middle East if NATO agrees), the “recommend CP” (The National Governors Association should strongly recommend that the US withdraw troops from the Middle East), and the “delay CP” (the US should withdraw troops from the Middle East after the 2024 election). These counterplans compete with certainty and immediacy. What this means is that when the aff fiats a plan like “The US should withdraw troops from the Middle East,” the implementation must be immediate and certain.
On the other hand, while the counterplan itself is immediate and certain, the “withdraw troops from the Middle East” action is not, thus distinguishing itself from the aff. Process counterplans generally compete off of small internal net benefits of the process (balancing state-federal power, strengthening international relations, etc) or time-sensitive disads like elections or politics. Generally, process counterplans are frowned upon but not rejected at face value. However, the practice of competing off of just certainty and immediacy is questionable at best. Intuitively, process counterplans feel like disingenuous strategies, but more objectively, this can be seen by their effect of centering the debate on the same stale topic of whether consulting Japan or asking the NGA is needed rather than the topic at hand. The neg can just copy-paste their files from one topic to the next without doing any research on the topic while stealing all aff ground. While PICs are sometimes accused of “stealing aff ground,” they still fundamentally change the policy at hand, opening the door to discussions of solvency deficits. On the other hand, process counterplans circumvent the aff entirely. Furthermore, a 7-minute LD 1NC can dump reasons why the slight net benefit of the process counterplan is a good thing while mooting all 6 minutes of the 1AC.
Finally, we must question the practice of forcing the aff to be implemented “immediately” (and “certainly,” but I’ll explain why that’s less important later). Negatives running a process CP will typically rely on definitions of “should” “ought” or “resolved” to argue that aff fiat must be immediate and certain. This is silly. Moral obligations have no implied timeframe, and the negative definitions will always be cherry-picked and fall apart under closer inspection. If I say “I should learn Chinese,” I am not reasonably expected to drop everything and enroll in a Chinese course; my statement only means that I believe it is desirable to learn Chinese in the near future. However, aff fiat should indeed be immediate and certain by default for a different reason: linking to DAs.
Things like politics, elections, international relations, and any other situational disad all rely on the aff being implemented in the current day, making it a good norm for fiat to be that way by default. However, this (correct) warrant is rarely used in the 1NC by the neg since it concedes the authority of fair and educational practices which is an uphill battle for a process CP debater. Overall, the process counterplan is a bad argument in terms of fairness and education, and to quote Ryan Galloway, “should be put on the ash heap of debate arguments” (2019).
Finally, the last of the counterplans is the agent counterplan. As the name implies, this is a counterplan that does the action of the affirmative but through a different agent. Some view it as a PIC out of the actor (Liu 2020), but it is important to note that agent counterplans are fundamentally different as they do not change the action at all, only the actor. The most widely accepted form of the agent counterplan is one that changes the actor of the plan from Congress to the executive or judicial branch.
Other examples include the states CP (all 50 US states uniformly enact the plan), international actor CPs (CP: Russia does the plan or CP: Iraq cracks down on human rights abuses), private actor CPs (CP: everyone adopts communism or CP: Apple donates all its profit to charity), or even metaphysical CPs (CP: people stop dying or CP: the laws of physics change). Agent counterplans have varying levels of acceptance on the circuit, and the order I listed the categories roughly parallels their perceived legitimacies. In truth—and here I diverge from a substantial portion of the debate community—it’s just a bad argument. Nobody wants to sit through another “courts vs congress” debate that completely derails from the plan.
While some agent CPs may be slightly more open to solvency deficits than process CPs, even the most reasonable ones still take all aff ground and compete off of a minuscule net benefit that only gets more stale every time. One of the most compelling arguments against agent CPs is that there is no higher actor with the power to evaluate which actor should be doing what. Nobody’s in a position to say “Instead of the US doing this, China should do that” in the real world, so even if the analysis is useful in some contexts, it cannot be a reason to reject the original plan.
Using fiat here isn’t a substitute for being powerless students but a departure from the real world altogether. It’s also convenient that a rejection of actor CPs cleanly brackets out some of the most egregiously abusive CPs (recommendation CPs, private actor CPs, etc). Overall, actor CPs are bad for fairness and education whose abuse potentials vastly outweigh what minimal educational value they may have.
The Opportunity Cost Model
All counterplans are, fundamentally, opportunity costs of the aff: what opportunity is the plan costing us? Proponents of negative fiat argue that alternate policies that don’t yet exist or may not be feasible are still important opportunities to consider. Other debaters more strictly define opportunities as those that already exist and believe that negative fiat is an invalid principle. Under this view, the counterplan operates entirely within the status quo, and the feasibility of the counterplan in the first place impacts the cost of not being able to do it.
To evaluate this model, and the following models as well, we must revisit the assumption so blithely asserted in the introduction: “In a debate environment… [a better action] seems to be a valid objection to an aff plan.”
Is that necessarily true? Does the aff plan have to be the best option, or just better than the status quo? Interestingly, the discussion around finding a “good enough” plan versus the “best possible” plan parallels a common paradigm issue in a very different set of arguments: theory. If you’re experienced in theory debates, the phrase “good enough” has probably jumped out already, as it is the crux of reasonability vs competing interpretations debates. For those unfamiliar, theory is a method of norm-setting where one debater calls out a practice for being unfair or uneducational. In response, the accused debater must defend that their practices are valid, and a common appeal is that their practices, while not perfect, are “good enough” in a vacuum. For example, imagine a debater is called out for using an 11-point font, with the logic that a 12-point font is more accessible, more easily read, and better for information retention, backed by a study. In the face of this evidence, it is hard for the accused debater to argue that an 11-point font is better or even as good as a 12-point font, yet they will still feel the objection to be frivolous and unproductive.
They will instead argue that the practice of using an 11-point font is reasonable in a vacuum, even if the 12-point font is marginally better, and appeal to the fact that infinitely accommodating to unpredictable, constantly changing minute rules is net worse for debate’s accessibility and generation of education. This is the reasonability argument. The accusing debater, on the other hand, will argue that if their interpretation of valid and invalid practices is a better model than the defensive interpretation, they should win the round so that the best norms propagate through the debate community. Even if in that round, the norm violation isn’t a huge issue, it’s worth it to vote on the norm so that all debaters quickly adapt to the norm, which is a net benefit for debate. This is the competing interps argument. In the context of counterplans, the discussion of whether a better alternative is necessarily an indictment of the original proposition mirrors this closely since the defender of the plan will claim that if their policy is “good,” then it should earn the vote even if other options were better.
To evaluate whether the strict “opportunity cost” model is appropriate, we should examine its ability to foster the discussions produced by different types of counterplans. To its benefit, this model does a nice job of eliminating irrelevant counterplans like “CP: the world creates a global government” since the feasibility of such an action is unlikely to be affected by the plan. Process and actor counterplans in general are unlikely to be feasible enough to function under this model. What about legitimate counterplans? An advantage counterplan would look like a status quo impact defense: “Climate change is already being solved” as opposed to “Here is a better way of solving climate change.” This does not create the same discussion that a traditional advantage counterplan does, and is, in general, an unappealing argument. The same applies to the PIC because the negative would have to argue that part of the aff is already happening, so it becomes nothing more than impact defense. Uniqueness counterplans would look like normal disads. For example, in the Ukraine vs Middle East jet deployment example, the neg would have to win that the US would indeed send its jets over to Ukraine in the absence of other commitments. Thus, it is safe to say that the elimination of neg fiat kills the counterplan.
Is that a bad thing? In the US Congress, if a bill can be shown to be definitively positive I’m sure it would pass a vote with flying colors regardless of alternatives, but nobody’s asking us to be Congresspeople. Furthermore, even in Congress, bills are drafted with alternate actions in mind and ideally should be attempts at achieving the best solution possible. Regardless, debate is fundamentally an academic activity: it exists to foster discussion and education. As a result, when a topic is released and hundreds of debates occur about how to solve issues, we expect as a community that the overarching goal is to produce genuine discourse and rigorously test a proposed action. The advantage of debate is that we can isolate the discussion from concerns about political alliances or feasibility to pursue the best possible solution. This has the unique advantage of being able to bring to light discussions far from the mainstream and give them legitimate evaluations that could never happen without the context of neg fiat. Even if we say that the burden of the neg is strictly to prove the aff undesirable, isn’t an action that blocks us from making other good actions undesirable? Even in cases like the uniqueness counterplan, where no attempt is made to solve the same harm as the aff and thus the CP is not a “better solution” but rather a “better action,” the same arguments apply: if the aff costs us good opportunities, we should be able to weigh that cost regardless of if those opportunities are on track to be realized in the status quo.
Apart from the role of debaters, an important consideration is also the role of the judge. In a topic where the US Federal Government is the actor, is voting aff the imaginary equivalent of the US government passing a bill? Or is the judge meant to be an “impartial, informed, and eclectic viewpoint,” listening to the arguments and deciding what idea they endorse (Solt 1989)? In any case, it seems that it would be in the best interest of the judge to find and vote for the best action between competing choices, and well within their jurisdiction to do so.
Returning to the “opportunity cost” model, we can conclude that eliminating neg fiat is probably too harsh. It shuts down our ability to look for creative new solutions or better ways to spend our resources. This is also the consensus in most debate circuits.
Another Approach
The “no neg fiat” model may very well be better than the blank slate of “no limitations on neg fiat,” as a pure “advantages vs disadvantages” debate is still somewhat fair, while a complete abuse of neg fiat is unwinnable for the aff. Ironically, the “no neg fiat” model can be rejected despite this, in favor of a more balanced model of restricting neg fiat. Perhaps neg fiat should be allowed as long as it maintains the same actor as the affirmative plan. A model that forces counterplans to use the same actors is very helpful in excluding the classic actor counterplan as well as silly variations like the international actor, private actor, or even metaphysical actor counterplans. Process counterplans are a little trickier to exclude, as interpretations like “process counterplans bad” or “counterplans must not result in the plan” are vague and hard to define. Any good neg debater will explain how these rules arbitrarily limit neg ground; even the status quo might result in the plan! Maybe the approach can be as simple as “counterplans must not compete off of certainty or immediacy.”
That seems to exclude the root of the problem without arbitrarily excluding any legitimate counterplans. Even if an uncertain version of the plan is not a viable form of aff, it is certainly arguable that this being the only difference makes for an unfair and uneducational round. Since we’ve already discussed why definitionally, the aff need not be immediate, it might be even more favorable to exclude only immediacy-based competition. This isn’t a problem due to a neat trick called the lie perm (Watson 2021). The aff can simply say: “permutation: do the plan after a consultation with NATO” or “after initiating a binding Health Impact Assessment.” This solves the certainty part of the competition debate because the net benefit can be achieved with a certain plan. If the consulted party says “no,” the impacts of the aff should outweigh anyway. Some even argue that this perm doesn’t even sever immediacy since the process begins in the present, making it just a form of normal means. This isn’t a bad argument, especially if the perm is phrased such that the binding agreement is made in the present. However, it is generally a weak stance for a neg to be competing off of just immediacy anyway, as it opens the door to delay CPs which are widely rejected as unfair and uneducational. At the same time, I’d watch out for negative arguments along the lines of “if perms can sever out of immediacy, then do the CP and then the aff 40 years later kills all legitimate CPs.” You could also make specific theory arguments against the type of process CP you’re running into on the grounds of educational value.
Returning to the multi-actor international fiat example brought up at the beginning of this article, with an open borders aff vs a “unilateral democracy and rights” CP, limiting the scope of neg fiat to actions that can be taken by respective international governments is enough to make this a debatable round. Even if it seems like an unfair or disingenuous counterplan, a good aff about open borders could talk about why they are fundamental as rights, or
explain that laws to help with human rights can still be circumvented at local levels, or that inherent unequal resource distributions still make open borders necessary. As long as the neg CP is phrased as an action that governments can do and not a utopian hypothetical, there is enough room for healthy debate.
As a final note, keep in mind that not all judges share the same opinions and that winning a superior model of debate still comes down to what’s said in each debate round. As a result, I would highly discourage going just for theory in the 1AR (or 2AC), even if you’re sure the CP is illegitimate; instead, mix in a healthy dose of perms and solvency deficits to give yourself enough outs in later speeches. You could also go for multiple theory shells but don’t nest them in a way that allows a generic defense of the CP to take them all out in one go. Additionally, the model for CPs established in this article is generalized for the sake of creating a coherent conceptual framework. While this is important as a background for evaluating the validity of a CP, your in-round theory shells should be as specific to the opponent’s abuse as possible (don’t read “agent CPs bad” against private actor fiat) to garner the most offense and eat up the neg’s defense.
References:
Branham, R. J. (1989). Roads Not Taken: Counterplans and Opportunity Costs. The Journal of the American Forensic Association, 25(4), 246–255.
Galloway, R. (2019, August 22). To consult or not to consult: on the theoretical legitimacy of the consultation counterplan. DebateUS.
Liu, M. (2020, March 21). Counterplans 101: Types of counterplans. Wyoming Debate Roundup.
Solt, R. (1989). Negative Fiat: Resolving the Ambiguities of “Should.” The Journal of the American Forensic Association, 25(3), 121–139.
Watson, C. (2021, April 23). This Argument Ends the Process Counterplan. Spartan Debate.